Nevin's Data "Points"

It may have lacked the hoopla of a midnight Harry Potter release, but in retirement industry circles, last week’s publication of the Department of Labor’s final regulations on qualified default investment alternatives (QDIAs) was nearly as eagerly anticipated. And, like the speculation as to which Potter character would survive the latest saga, the early betting had been that stable value would not make the QDIA cut—and, in large part, that turned out to be the case. Instead, stable-value (or more precisely, capital preservation) vehicle proponents had to content themselves with a sanction as a short-term repository for contributions (up to 120 days—long enough to accommodate the 90-day period that defaulted participants have to opt out), and the assurances from the DoL that they were sure that those vehicles would find a home alongside other options in the time-focused asset-allocation products that were accorded QDIA status (ironically, IMHO, in that regard, capital preservation veh

I was at a conference a couple of weeks ago, when the CEO of a large, national consulting firm stood up and commented on the increased fiduciary burden that the Pension Protection Act had placed on plan sponsors – an obligation to ensure that participants’ savings are sufficient to provide an adequate retirement. Now, in fairness, I wasn’t paying a LOT of attention to him when he stood up. He wasn’t on the panel, and I was trying to finish taking down some notes from the comments of someone who was. Nonetheless, I think I got the essence of his perspective—that PPA has created a new level of fiduciary responsibility for plan sponsors—correct. Even if I missed some nuance in that particular instance (and I wasn’t the only one to hear it that way), I’m hearing that sentiment more and more these days—at least from the provider community. Now, there are a lot of troubling things in the PPA for defined benefit plan sponsors, though not as bad as many feared, and certainly not as bad now t

We spend a fair amount of time worrying about the relatively small percentage of workers who choose not to participate—at all, fully, or effectively—in their workplace savings plan. Well that we should, because for a myriad of reasons, they are letting a great opportunity pass them by. However, the real crisis, IMHO, is not about the minority that we hope to stir to action with devices like automatic enrollment, tailored communications, and personal advice. Rather, the real crisis is the majority of American workers who lack even the opportunity to participate in a workplace retirement plan. Certainly, those people are on politicians’ minds, as evidenced by last week’s proposal by Senator Hillary Clinton that purports to provide "universal access to a generous 401(k) for all Americans.” Now, you can argue whether tax credits for the middle- and lower-income workers targeted will be enough to motivate them to take action, and you can certainly take issue with the price tag (and

The testimony presented at last week’s hearing by the House Education and Labor Committee on the issue of 401(k) fees (see 401(k) Fee Disclosure Proposal Draws Industry Criticism at Committee Hearing ) was remarkably consistent, IMHO, certainly compared with the last time the Committee took up the issue (see Congressional Committee Hears 401(k) Fee Disclosure Testimony ). At a minimum, we seem to have moved past the question of whether more fee disclosure is needed to what kind of disclosures are needed, and how we can make them. At the risk of over-generalizing the perspectives of the individuals (and individuals on behalf of groups) who shared their experience/expertise with the House Committee, it seems to me that everyone supports the following conclusions: (1) We need a better understanding of 401(k) fees. (2) We need more disclosure about what 401(k) fees are. (3) We should let the Department of Labor finish their regulations on fee disclosure before doing anything legislatively