Nevin's Data "Points"

Twenty years ago, I authored [i] a cover story about the then-newly enacted Pension Protection Act of 2006 with an ambitious headline: “The Pension Protection Act: This Changes Everything.”   Twenty years later, it seems like a reasonable time to ask: Did It? The short answer, I think, is yes — though probably not quite in the ways we expected in 2006. The PPA was a sweeping piece of bipartisan legislation, addressing among other things defined benefit funding, pension accounting, and cash balance plans — it was titled the PENSION Protection Act, after all.  And it was, for the benefits promised by those plans, an important defensive measure. [ii]    However, to my eyes then — and now — the most lasting influence of the PPA was on the defined contribution side, where it helped change not just plan design, but the industry's thinking about participant behavior. To Appreciate 2006, Go Back to 1986 Twenty years earlier, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 had significantly tigh...

Which is more powerful—a generous match, or a high savings rate default?  As it turns out, Christmas Eve brought us a new white paper with the fairly innocuous title, “ The Impact of Employer Defaults and Match Rates on Retirement Saving .” Indeed, there have been plenty of surveys (and tons of data) that speak to this issue (many of which are cited as references in the paper)—but underneath that bland title the authors take on an intriguing question, specifically how, and how differently, the deployment of specific plan design features—the employer match, or default enrollment—impact retirement savings.  With regard to the former, there’s been plenty of real data to buttress the notion that the employer match acts as a virtual target for retirement savings—with employee contributions clustering around those like moths to a flame, regardless of the savings needs or income wherewithal of the participant. Similarly, we’ve long—but even more so since the advent of t...

I recently wrote about what’s wrong with automatic enrollment . Turns out there’s more – and it has to do with when things actually go “wrong” with automatic enrollment. See, it’s one thing to say that eligible employees should be automatically enrolled – and yet another to actually get them enrolled automatically. Even the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) goes so far as to acknowledge that two common errors found in 401(k) plans are: (1) not giving an eligible employee the opportunity to make elective contributions; and (2) failing to execute an employee’s salary deferral election. Now, as it turns out, both are “fixable” – through the Employee Plans Compliance Resolution System (EPCRS). But that’s only the start of things. See, in both of those situations you’re looking at a corrective contribution of 50% of the missed deferral (adjusted for earnings) for the affected employee. And then fully vesting the employee in those contributions – contributions that are subject to ...

It’s hard to believe, but the Pension Protection Act of 2006 will be a decade old next month. And it’s probably done more good for the nation’s retirement security than most realize. The PPA drew its name from the portions targeted at shoring up defined benefit plans (and PBGC funding, I suppose), though at the time I remember most people thinking it was an ironic name, in that it may have been intended to secure the pensions that were already in existence, but might well accelerate the demise of some on the cusp, and in any event was unlikely to help spur any new growth in that area. Some went so far as to call it the Pension Destruction Act. Indeed, at a recent panel session featuring the perspectives of a number of the Hill staffers who shepherded the at times controversial legislation through its passage, the emphasis was largely on the DB aspects that, though well-intentioned, had been overwhelmed (if not undermined) by the onset of the 2008 financial crisis and the “histor...

For all the good press and positive results that automatic enrollment gets, one might well expect that every plan would embrace it. And yet today, nearly a decade after the passage of the Pension Protection Act, many still don’t. So, why don’t all plans use automatic enrollment — and what can you do about it? Here are the primary objections that I have heard from plan sponsors — and some possible responses. Cost. The simple reality is that automatic enrollment “works,” which is to say that overnight, it has the very real potential of transforming a long-standing plan participation rate of 67% or 75% to 95% or greater. The other simple reality is that when you take that likely increase in participation rate (generally from 70% to 95% or so), and then figure out the increase in matching dollars that would result — well, it can be a sudden budget jolt, particularly when you think about it applying to an employee population that is likely more tenured and highly compensated. Per...

Advisors and providers often talk about the “ideal” plan — but ideal for what? That’s a rhetorical question of sorts — generally it means “ideal” in terms of providing a better retirement savings outcome. Indeed, I routinely see articles and commentaries (and panel presentations) that self-righteously take employers to task for not “caring” enough about their workers (or their retirement outcomes) to do the “right” things. While I think our industry views such observations as a challenge, a call to action, all too often I think policymakers and regulators — and certainly the 401(k) “haters” — hear a different message. While I suspect that one-on-one, most advisors allow for a more nuanced perspective on such things, at the risk of stirring up a little controversy, let me offer a different perspective on that “ideal” plan. Extending Automatic Enrollment to All Following the passage of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, with its automatic enrollment safe harbor, many likely ass...

One of the most celebrated plan design features of the 401(k) era is automatic enrollment. Nearly as old as the 401(k) itself, once upon a time it was called a “negative election.” But regardless of the name, the concept has been extraordinarily effective at not only getting, but keeping, workers saving via their workplace retirement plans. However, adoption of the design, after a surge in the wake of the passage of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, now seems to have plateaued. Moreover, current data suggests that, while automatic enrollment adoption has certainly had a positive impact on retirement outcomes, we’re not getting as much mileage from it as we might. So, here are three things that plan sponsors — and others — should know about automatic enrollment. 1. You don’t have to default contributions at 3%. Three percent was the standard default contribution rate for automatic enrollment plans long before the Pension Protection Act of 2006 incorporated it as part of its au...

In recent years, the notion that the ways in which choices are presented to individuals — known as “choice architecture” — can influence their decisions, has been widely embraced. Well before the advent of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, the retirement plan industry had acknowledged the positive influences of those behavioral finance techniques on overcoming, or at least countering, certain human behaviors. Based on the evidence of several decades of adoption, we know that automatic enrollment — even with the ability to opt out — transforms voluntary participation rates of roughly 70% to near-unanimous participation. And yet, even with the structure and sanction of the PPA, today fewer than half of the roughly 7,000 plan sponsor respondents to the 2013 PLANSPONSOR DC Survey have implemented that design (large plans being significantly more likely to do so than smaller programs). Even plan sponsors that have adopted automatic enrollment tend to do so with a default deferral ra...

British Statesman and Philosopher Edmund Burke famously commented that “”Those who don’t know history are destined to repeat it.”(1) Indeed, those with experience working with employee benefit plans, can attest to a certain déjà vu-esque quality amidst the recent discussions about tax reform, limiting deductions, and “capping” contributions. These, are, in many ways, old “solutions,”(2) albeit these days arguably applied to a new (or at least different) set of circumstances. As the 113th Congress begins its work, and the Obama administration readies for a second term, it is perhaps not surprising that the nuances of employee benefit plans and their tax treatment might not be an area of expertise for many on Capitol Hill. However, for all the longevity in tenure frequently assumed regarding those in Congress, a review of the data shows just how much turnover has taken place. For example, you might not be surprised to learn that no member of the current Senate was in office when Me...

Earlier this week, an EBRI research report quantified the financial impact of setting a higher starting point for 401(k) default contributions—and it can be significant. Most private-sector employers that automatically enroll their 401(k) participants do so at a default rate of 3 percent of pay,(1) a level consistent with the starting rate set out in the Pension Protection Act of 2006 as part of its automatic enrollment safe harbor provisions—but it’s a rate that many financial experts acknowledge is far too low to generate sufficient assets for a comfortable retirement. EBRI has previously modeled the impact of automatic enrollment(2) (see “The Impact of Automatic Enrollment in 401(k) Plans on Future Retirement Accumulations: A Simulation Study Based on Plan Design Modifications of Large Plan Sponsors,” online here ). In the most recent research, using EBRI’s proprietary Retirement Security Projection Model® (RSPM), the impact of raising the default contribution rate to 6 percent...

It should come as no surprise that the vast majority of plan sponsors who have adopted automatic enrollment have chosen to default that initial deferral at 3% of pay. No, that’s not the level at which most plans match deferrals, and it’s certainly not a level of deferral likely to produce sufficient retirement savings. It is, however, the starting deferral rate attributed to such programs under the auto-enroll safe harbor provisions in the Pension Protection Act (PPA). Coincidence? I think not. Ironically, that same safe harbor provision requires that employers either go back and automatically enroll all eligible participants (giving them the ability to opt-out), or be able to establish that they did at some point (see “ The Pension Protection Act: This Changes Everything ”). Most providers, certainly pre-PPA, were unable to provide the requisite proof of those prior enrollments—and thus it would seem that most employers seeking the protections of that auto-enroll safe harbor woul...